Fixed Texts

In my American context, “fixed” texts have provided authority over many people’s lives, namely the Bible and the Constitution. Like many I have kept the odd eye on the Sotomayor hearings, and the questions posed to her by various senators. In particular are questions probing whether or not Sotomayor will interpret the Constitution the way that it has been interpreted in the past, or “traditionally.” In fact, I am surprised by the underlying thinking of some of the senators, seemingly unaware of philosophical and literary developments over the past century. On another occasion, I was in a study group for my Ph.D. qualifying exams discussing feminist criticism of the Bible. There was a voice here that wished to get rid of certain biblical text because they were too oppressive to women. In both cases, there are underlying assumptions of the fixed meaning in texts that guide the lives of many.

Let me illustrate my point by pointing out a problem in the development of Protestant biblical interpretation. In the 16^th century, Martin Luther attempted to reform the Western church with Sola Scriptura. The problem as he saw it was that Church Doctrine allowed too much for the abuse of power because Church authority was based upon Tradition and Scripture. The Tradition of the Church was long and growing, particularly in regard to the precedents of Canon Law (not unlike our Constitutional Law). The subjectivity of such Traditions were made secondary to Scripture by Luther, because the Scriptures could not grow or change—they were “fixed.” Luther said, "I do not wish to boast that I am more learned than all, but that scripture alone should reign, nor do I pretend that it is to be interpreted by my spirit or that of other men. But I wish to understand it by its spirit." By this singular spirit of scripture, Luther’s church found its authority.

But modern linguistics, philisophy, and literary theory has showed us that meaning is not entirely within a text, but that both the author and reader and their previous experiences add to any certain meaning. In other words, meaning is contextual. I am not arguing that the universe is meaningless nor that there is no absolute truth, but that meaning and “truth” are always viewed through the lenses of certain contexts. I have little room to make such an argument here, but the works of Derrida and Foucault, as well as postcolonial theorists, would be a good place to start. The result is that Luther missed a significant problem with texts: they are equally subject to the problems of interpretation as the Church Traditions were. Texts always must be interpreted. Period. That interpretation is a subjective process, and therefore causes differences in the understanding. If you don’t believe me just look at the number of denominations that have split because of differences in biblical interpretation or the divide in constitutional interpretation between different political factions. The texts are not solid, but they are places to begin conversations.

An argument for a more “original” interpretation of texts is subject to the same problems that Luther recognized in the the interpretation in Church Traditions. Searches for a more original anything are bound to the same problems of interpretation that any text or any law is bound by. Therefore, texts should be the starting place and guidelines for conversations. But that conversation should not be wasted (as it has been in the Sotomayor hearings) by arguing that one should follow a previous reading of a text, but rather, we should take the opportunity to dicuss which interpretive lenses will be appropriate for our context, together.